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SUBJECT

MEETING ON PANAMA

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Arnold R. Isaacs, D/INR/IAA
James Buchanan

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PENTAGON

Col. James Congilio, DIO/DIA

695-0198

2A520

Lt. Col. William Spracher ODSCINT

694-9738

2A474

Renee LaBauve OPNAV-0094212

695-3974

5B686

Christopher Silva AFIS/INAW

695-7817

4B879

DIA/JSI-4B

697-3541

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DIAC

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DIA/DE3

373-4531

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DIA/DR2C

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NAVY ANNEX

Lt. Col. Michael O'Hara HQMC/INTP

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REMARKS:

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TREASURY

Mr. Randall Fort, Office of Intelligence Support

566-2631

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REMARKS:

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 02734-88
1 August 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Representatives
FROM: [REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: National Intelligence Estimate 84-88
PANAMA: OUTLOOK FOR POLITICAL CHANGE

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1. As a result of the Interagency Meeting held on 22 July 1988, the DCI has given his approval to proceed with the drafting of an National Intelligence Estimate on Panama. Attached for your review are the Concept Paper and Terms of Reference for NIE 84-88 PANAMA: OUTLOOK FOR POLITICAL CHANGE.

2. You are invited to an interagency meeting to discuss the TORs at 1030 hours, Friday, 5 August 1988 in Room 7E32, CIA Headquarters. Please pass the names of attendees and their clearances to [REDACTED] by noon, 4 August 1988.

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Attachment:
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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 02733-88
1 August 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Representatives

FROM: Martin W. Roeber
National Intelligence Officer for Latin AmericaSUBJECT: Intelligence Community Meeting to Discuss Possible National
Intelligence Estimate on Panama

1. On 22 July 1988, Intelligence Community representatives met to discuss the efficacy and possible structure of a National Intelligence Estimate on Panama. On balance the representatives, with some reservations, agreed that an Intelligence Community product would be useful, but that it should not project out much beyond one year. [REDACTED]

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2. Prior to the meeting I informally polled major players among both intelligence producers and consumers. The NSC and State/ARA favor an Estimate. The DIO also supported an Estimate and found that the JCS and ISA also responded positively. USSOUTHCOM in Panama strongly supports doing an Estimate that looks out as far as possible. State/INR opposed it, and Navy and NSA expressed some objections. [REDACTED]

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3. At the meeting, those who argued most strongly for an Estimate--such as DIA--believed that an Intelligence Community coordinated assessment was necessary for informational purposes for senior officials and to aid in meeting the many briefing requirements. Others felt that the failure to consider the many pieces of the Panamanian puzzle in one place left some potential gaps, notably no net assessment. Those who questioned the timing of an Estimate--led by State/INR--argued that analysts could not write a useful paper [REDACTED]. In addition, INR believed that the situation was too fluid and that it would be difficult to produce an Estimate that did not read like a "policy options" paper. The NSA representative added that the sense in his Agency was that the Intelligence Community was still in a "warning mode" on Panama--not an Estimative one--and that there were too many potential variables and options. [REDACTED]

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4. After additional discussion, however, a consensus emerged in support of an Intelligence Community product. There was general agreement that it should focus both on the near-term tactics of the major players--Noriega, the military, and the opposition--as well as on the question of whether the impact of the crisis is bringing about a sea-change within Panama both in terms of the role of the armed forces and the economic and foreign policy orientation of the government. There also was general agreement that with few additions, many of the same key questions posed for the June 1987 Memorandum to Holders would still be relevant. [REDACTED]

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